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I. Introduction
California must lower its greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions to 1990 levels
by 20201 and to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.2  In order to lower the 
State’s cumulative GHG emissions, in late 2011, the State approved a cap-and-
trade program requiring certain business firms to reduce their GHG emissions.3  
As an alternative to reducing emissions, firms may purchase forest-based offsets 
that result in an equivalent emissions reduction elsewhere.4  These offsets may 
be tradable within California and other linked systems.   
Forest-based offsets take advantage of a forest’s ability to convert carbon 
dioxide to solid carbon, thus reducing the amount of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere.5  Within a forest, trees absorb carbon through photosynthesis and 
store it in biomass, including the trunk, leaves, branches, and roots.6  Carbon is 
also stored in soil, plants, and floor litter.7  This absorption and storage is 
biological carbon sequestration (hereinafter referred to merely as “carbon 
sequestration.”)8  These offsets typically require implementation of changes in 
1. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §
38550–(West 2011). 
2. Cal. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (Jun. 1, 2005), available at  http://www.dot.ca.
gov/hq/energy/ExecOrderS-3-05.htm. 
3. Cal. Air Res. Bd., California Cap-and-Trade Program, Resolution 11-32, 2, 4 (Oct.
20, 2011) [hereinafter Resolution 11-32], available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/ 
regact/2010/capandtrade10/res11-32.pdf.  
4. Cal. Air Res. Bd., Climate Change Proposed Scoping Plan: A Framework for Change,
37 (2008) [hereinafter Scoping Plan], http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/ 
document/scopingplandocument.htm. 
5. Econ. & Tech. Advancement Advisory Comm. (“ETAAC”), Final Report:
Technologies and Policies to Consider for Reducing Greenhouse Gas Emissions in California, 2 (Feb. 
11, 2008) [hereinafter ETAAC Report], http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/etaac/ETAACFinal 
Report2-11-08.pdf. 
6. See generally Cal. Climate Action Reg., California Climate Action Registry Forest
Project Protocol (Aug. 20, 2010) [hereinafter Forest Protocol], http://www. 
climateactionreserve.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/08/Forest_Project_Protocol_V3.2_ 
For_Board_Approval1.pdf. 
7. Id.; see also Rebecca K. Smith, Our National Forests as Carbon Sinks: A Timely
and Appropriate Change in Management Emphasis, 29 PUB. LAND & RESOURCE L. REV. 183, 
187 (2009) (“[F]orests store 50 percent of their carbon in soil, 10 percent in woody 
debris, six percent in the forest floor, one percent in the understory, and only 33 
percent in living trees.”). 
8. Biological carbon sequestration is distinct from geological carbon
sequestration.  Geological sequestration involves the injection of carbon 
underground through a process called “carbon capture and storage.”  This article only 
considers biological sequestration, and all references to “sequestration” or “carbon 
sequestration” refer only to biological sequestration.  For a basic discussion of the 
difference between biological and geological sequestration, see Carbon Dioxide (CO
2
) or 
Carbon Sequestration, OUR CLIMATE, http://www.ourclimate.net/sequestration.htm (last 
visited April 30, 2011).   
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forest management that increase that carbon sequestration.  Management 
changes include allowing timber to grow past economic maturity, increasing 
buffer zones surrounding forests, changing clear cuts to group selection cuts, 
and reducing the likelihood of catastrophic fires.9 
Despite the promise of forest-based carbon sequestration, it is unclear 
whether these offsets meet the basic requirements common to all offset 
systems, including permanence and enforceability.  Without assurance that 
offsets are permanent, transferable, and adequately enforceable, firms may not 
feel secure in purchasing them,10  and California may lose the benefits of forest-
based carbon sequestration.  The mandatory nature of California’s scheme 
amplifies the necessity of well-defined rights that are enforceable and 
transferable.11    
Various legal tools can be used to define and support forest-based offsets 
to ensure they perform as needed; however, present tools are inadequate.  For 
example, while leaseholds and conservation easements are currently used to 
support forest-based offsets, they were not created with the unique 
characteristics of these offsets in mind.  Current legal tools may not ensure that 
an offset projects is viable for the time necessary to truly sequester carbon,12 
thus the project would not satisfy the 100-year permanence element required of 
all offset projects.13 
In the long term, these shortcomings could affect the enforceability of 
elements necessary to create a successful forest-based offset project.  In 
addition, the current legal framework leaves room for debate regarding the 
ownership of the carbon versus the forest components that sequester the 
carbon.14  Uncertainty surrounding ownership creates a hurdle to the transfer of 
forest-based offsets within a market context.   
If created and implemented with care, a statutory right clarifying these 
issues would provide more secure support for forest-based offset projects.  A 
carbon sequestration right in the form of an easement provides an opportunity 
to ensure permanence as well as enforceability and transferability of forest-
based offset projects.  A carbon sequestration easement would be a real 
9. SANDRA BROWN ET AL, PIER FINAL PROJECT REPORT: CARBON SUPPLY FROM
CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT OF FOREST, RANGE, AND AGRICULTURAL LANDS IN CALIFORNIA:
FOREST, 500-04-068F, 2 (March 2004), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/ 
pier/project_reports/500-04-068.html. 
10. Matthieu Wemaere et al, Legal Ownership and Nature of Kyoto Units and EU
Allowances, LEGAL ASPECTS OF CARBON TRADING: KYOTO, COPENHAGEN, AND BEYOND 35, 50 
(David Freestone & Charlotte Streck, eds. 2009) (“The less defined and secure the 
allowances are, the less likely potential buyers will be willing to invest in them.”). 
11. Id. at 45.
12. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 7.
13. Id.
14. See infra, Part III.B.2.
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property right because ownership of sequestered carbon is a stick in an owner’s 
bundle of rights.15  It could be similar to a conservation easement; however, it 
must be tailored to the nonperpetual nature of forest-based offsets and must 
specify who owns the sequestered carbon.   
A carbon sequestration easement would provide the strong enforcement 
rights associated with real property rights, including the use of injunctions to 
prevent or stop alterations to the forest that may negatively affect carbon 
sequestration.  It would clarify which parties have standing to bring enforcement 
actions and against whom they may bring action.  This type of easement would 
also specify who may sell a forest-based offset within a market setting.   
Other factors will influence the scope, nature, and usefulness of a carbon 
sequestration easement in facilitating forest-based offsets.  A California real 
property right will not apply on land outside of the state’s jurisdiction.  This 
includes federal and tribal land within California’s borders, as well as land in 
other states and countries.  Due to California’s likely incorporation in a market 
that includes Canadian provinces,16 solving this problem is of the utmost 
importance to ensure that a carbon sequestration easement is actually useful.   
The most direct solution is for other states, the federal government, and 
other countries to pass their own carbon sequestration legislation.  In the 
meantime, and to successfully incorporate forest-based offset projects outside 
of California’s jurisdiction, an insurance program can bridge the jurisdictional 
gaps.  Such a program would require less insurance for offset projects supported 
by a carbon sequestration easement and more insurance for those supported by 
less effective legal tools.  
Discussions regarding the necessity and form of a potential carbon right 
have begun.17  This Note is meant to assist and further these discussions and to 
promote the use of a carbon sequestration easement in order to secure the use 
of forest-based offsets within a cap-and-trade market.  Part II discusses 
California’s current legal framework, the background of offsets, and cooperation 
with the Western Climate Exchange, a regional GHG emission reduction 
scheme.  Part III identifies the environmental, regulatory, and legal challenges 
facing current forest-based offset projects.  Part IV introduces the use of a 
carbon sequestration easement to support forest-based offsets and discusses 
the potential benefits of such a legal tool.  Part V analyzes the scope of a carbon 
15. In Roseland Plantation, LLC v. U. S. Fish and Wildlife Serv., 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 29334 (W.D. La. April 5, 2006), the Court definitively found that “while it is not 
clear at the present time that [carbon] credits could be sold, they make up a portion 
of the bundle of rights in the real property.”  
16. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at ES-8.
17. The Carbon Rights Discussion Group, a group of environmental law
experts, is currently drafting a model statute for a carbon sequestration easement. 
See Carbon Rights Roundtable Discussion: Meeting Summary and Proposed Next Steps (July 21, 
2010) [hereinafter Roundtable Discussion] (on file with author).    
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sequestration right and ways to expand the scope to make the right practical. 
Part VI concludes that despite the potential obstacles surrounding a carbon 
sequestration right the use of a carbon sequestration easement, if properly 
drafted, will support forest-based offsets. 
II. Current Regulation
Under the California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”),
California must lower its GHG emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.18  In addition, 
pursuant to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger’s Executive Order, California must 
further reduce emissions to 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.19   
The California Air Resource Board, California Climate Action Registry, and 
the Climate Action Reserve will help guide California through the reduction 
process.  The majority of reductions will occur through California’s participation 
in a regional cap-and-trade market, which will include the transfer of forest-
based offsets.  In order to enter the market, these offset projects must not only 
satisfy the elements universal to all such projects but also California’s specific 
forest-based offset guidelines.  
A. Main Entities Under AB 32
The California Air Resources Board, the California Climate Action Registry, 
and the Climate Action Reserve each have important roles under AB 32.  The 
California Air Resource Board (“CARB”) is a part of the California Environmental 
Protection Agency.20  Its purpose is to reduce air pollutants in light of economic 
concerns in order to “promote and protect” the public’s health.21  It is the main 
governmental agency responsible for implementing AB 3222 and accordingly 
drafted the Climate Change Proposed Scoping Plan: A Framework for Change 
(“Scoping Plan”), which specifies the way in which the agency will implement AB 
32 and achieve its mandates.23 
The Climate Action Reserve (“Reserve”) is a “national offset program” that 
works to ensure “integrity, transparency and financial value in the U.S. carbon 
18. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY §
38550–(West 2011). 
19. See supra note 2.
20. Cal/EPA Boards, Departments, and Offices, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY (May 25, 2010), http://www.calepa.ca.gov/CalEPA/default.htm.  
21. Id. (“The Air Resources Board’s (ARB) mission is to promote and protect
public health, welfare and ecological resources through the effective and efficient 
reduction of air pollutants in recognition and consideration of the effects on the 
economy of the state.”). 
22. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at ES-1.
23. Id.
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market.”24  Under AB 32, the Reserve drafted the California Climate Action 
Registry Forest Project Protocol (“Forest Protocol”), which specifies California’s 
standards for forest-based offset projects.25  It then issues carbon credits to 
project owners based on the reduction achieved by an offset project throughout 
the life of the project.26  The Reserve is the parent program of the California 
Climate Action Registry.27 
The California Climate Action Registry (“CCAR”) was created in response 
to a request by Californian companies for an official record of their GHG 
emissions.28  CCAR members, including some of the world’s largest 
corporations, universities, and environmental organizations, voluntarily 
“measure, verify, and publicly report” their GHG emissions.29  To effectuate 
efficient recording, CCAR created rules governing calculation and reporting of 
reductions.30  In 2011, CCAR transferred its recording responsibilities to the 
Climate Registry (“Registry”), though it will continue to advocate on behalf of its 
members.31  The Registry now publicly records GHG emissions from CCAR 
members, as well as other companies and organizations throughout the 
country.32  Through the Registry, CCAR members can apply their voluntary 
reductions to mandatory reductions required under AB 32.33  
B. Cap-and-Trade Based System
The Scoping Plan estimates that the use of a cap-and-trade market will 
achieve 85 percent of California’s required emissions reductions.34  Accordingly, 
24. About Us, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, http://www.climateactionreserve.org/
about-us/ (last visited April 23, 2011). 
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. See Overview, CALIFORNIA CLIMATE ACTION REGISTRY, http://www.
climateregistry.org/about.html (last visited April 23, 2011) [hereinafter Registry 
Website] (noting that “the California Registry will continue to accept 2009 
greenhouse gas emission reports through the end of 2010, and thereafter all 
emission reports should be submitted through The Climate Registry.”). 
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Registry Website, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. Id. (“After [CCAR] becomes read-only at the end of 2010, [it] will continue
to advocate on behalf of its members’ emission inventories to protect early actions 
made prior to the passing of AB32, and all emissions reports submitted to the 
California Registry will continue to exist in perpetuity.”). 
33. Id. (“The Board will later determine the appropriate credit to be given for
voluntary early actions and the conditions under which voluntary reductions may be 
used to comply with mandatory requirements[.]”). 
34. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at ES-3, 22.  There is some debate about this,
and it is currently undergoing California’s NEPA review.  Governor Schwarzenegger 
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CARB is currently working to codify statutes implementing the cap-and-trade 
market35 and expects to achieve full functionality by 2012.36   
A cap-and-trade system gives each firm within a regulated sector a limited 
amount of emission allowances.37  Each allowance permits the firm to release a 
certain quantity of GHGs into the atmosphere.38  The total allowances comprise 
the cap, the amount of emissions a firm may not exceed.  If a firm reduces its 
emissions below its cap and has leftover allowances, it may sell those 
allowances in the market.39  If a firm cannot reduce its emissions below its cap, it 
may purchase another firm’s excess allowances.40  Such a firm may also 
purchase an offset, which erases its own emissions to the extent the offset 
project reduced or avoided emissions.41   
C. Elements of an Offset Project
The purpose of an offset project is to either remove GHG emissions from 
the atmosphere or prevent emission in the first place.42  Offsets are a popular 
way to reduce emissions because they can be “standardized and quantified.”43  A 
appointed a Market Advisory Committee (“MAC”), whose goal is to recommend a 
useful form of market to satisfy AB 32.  The MAC recommended a cap-and-trade 
system.  See Market Advisory Comm., Recommendations for Designing a Greenhouse Gas 
Cap-and-Trade System for California 5–6 (2007) [hereinafter MAC Recommendations], 
available at http://www.climatechange.ca.gov/publications/market_advisory_ 
committee/2007-06-29_MAC_FINAL_REPORT.PDF. In addition, CARB determined 
that cap-and-trade system would be an effective way to satisfy the Act’s reduction 
mandate.  See ETAAC Report, supra note 5, at 1–4. 
35. See Cal. Envir. Prot, Agency Air Res. Bd., Proposed Regulation to Implement the
California Cap-and-Trade Program: Part 1 Volume 1, App. A (Oct. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.arb.ca.gov/regact/2010/capandtrade10/capv1appa.pdf.  The proposed 
regulation is currently enjoined from becoming effective because CARB did not 
receive approval for the proposal through the rulemaking process but instead went 
forward with the plan via a resolution to expedite the process.  For further 
discussion, see San Francisco Judge Deals a Major Setback to California’s Cap-and-Trade 
Program, NIXON PEABODY (March 24, 2011), http://www.nixonpeabody.com/ 
publications_detail3.asp?ID=3749.  
36. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at 1.
37. Id. at 35-36.
38. Id. at 30.
39. MAC Recommendations, supra note 34, at 5–6.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 36.
42. See Philippe Cullet et al. Activities Implemented Jointly in the Forestry Sector:
Conceptual and Operational Fallacies, 10 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 97, 109–110 (Fall, 1997) 
(citing Pedro Moura Costa, Tropical Forestry Practices for Carbon Sequestration: A Review and 
Case Study from Southeast Asia, 25 AMBIO 279 (1996)).     
43. See James L. Olmstead , Carbon Dieting: Latent Ancillary Rights to Carbon
Offsets in Conservation Easements, 29 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 121, 123 (2009) 
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marketable offset project must be verifiable, real, additional, and permanent.44  
In order to be verifiable, a project must have the ability to be measured, 
monitored, and enforced.45  To be measurable, an offset project must have a 
quantifiable amount of sequestered carbon.46  Monitoring is required to verify 
that an offset project meets its goals.47  Enforcement is necessary in order to 
assure an offset project meets the applicable standards.48   
An offset project must also be real, meaning that the project must actually 
reduce the GHG emissions it claims to reduce.  A project must address both 
activity shifting and market leakage.49  Activity-shifting leakage is the 
displacement of activities from within the offset project to a new location 
outside the project’s boundary, thus increasing emissions outside the project’s 
boundary.50  Market leakage occurs when an offset project changes an 
established market of goods, causing additional emissions that mitigate the 
project’s reductions; for example, avoided deforestation causes contractors to 
replace wood with products that emit more GHGs when building homes.51 
Activity shifting and market leakage must thus be deducted from an offset 
project’s total emission reduction.52   
In order to be additional, the offset project must reduce more emissions 
than already required by “any applicable land use laws or regulations.”53  
Essentially, if an emission reduction would have occurred in the absence of an 
offset project, then the offset project is not additional.54   
To be permanent, an offset project must store carbon for the time 
necessary to make the sequestration worthwhile, often considered 100 years.55  
Offset projects should be insured against the ever-present risk of forest 
[hereinafter Olmstead Carbon Dieting] (“Carbon offsets remain the most popular 
corporate anti-global warming measure.”). 
44. See Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 37.  See also Ross W. Gorte et al, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., RL34560, FOREST CARBON MARKETS: POTENTIAL AND DRAWBACKS 16 (2010) 
[hereinafter CRS Report], available at http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/ 
10Jun/RL34560.pdf.     
45. Id.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Olmstead Carbon Dieting, supra note 43, at 130.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 133.
52. Olmstead Carbon Dieting, supra note 43, at 130.
53. Id. at 128–29.
54. CRS Report, supra note 44, at 16.
55. Forest Protocol, supra note 5, at 7.  A 100-year timeframe is not unusual in
the timber industry. See generally Howard Kenison et al., Carbon Offsets from Soils and 
Forests—A Primer for Colorado Lawyers, 38 COLO. LAW 63 (Nov. 2009).  
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destruction.  Insurance usually requires the use of a back-up forest,56 where the 
project owner sets aside 10 percent to 60 percent of project’s emission 
reductions into an insurance pool.57 
D. California’s Forest-Based Offset Regulations
Forest-based offsets are commonly used to make voluntary GHG 
reductions.  These offsets reduce emissions by taking advantage of the forest as 
a carbon sink.58  Within a forest, trees sequester carbon through photosynthesis 
and store it in biomass.59  Carbon is also sequestered in the forest’s soil, plants, 
and floor litter.60  Essentially, the forest’s ability to store carbon and reduce 
emissions is the foundation of a forest-based offset project. 
California’s use of forest-based offsets is pursuant to AB 32,61 and firms 
may use these offsets to satisfy up to 49 percent of their cap.62  California’s offset 
standards are “rigorous and clear” in order to instill confidence in firms wishing 
to use offsets to meet their emission reduction goal.63   
Forest-based offsets, specifically, must meet the standards set forth under 
the Forest Protocol, which “provides requirements and guidance for quantifying 
the net climate benefits of activities that sequester carbon on forestland.”64  The 
Reserve drafted the first Forest Protocol in 2003 and has improved and revised it 
over the past eight years, culminating in the present Version 3.2.65  The Reserve’s 
goal is for the Forest Protocol to be a “rigorous, transparent, and comprehensive 
process . . . focusing on accurate and conservative accounting to ensure that 
credits are issued only for GHG reductions and removals that are real, 
56. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 61.
57. CRS Report, supra note 44, at 19.  The insurance requirement will be
discussed more in Part V.  
58. See generally What Are Carbon Sinks?, FERN, http://www.fern.org/campaign/
carbon-trading/what-are-carbon-sinks (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
59. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 2.
60. Id.  See also Smith, supra note 7, at 187 (“[F]orests store 50 percent of their
carbon in soil, 10 percent in woody debris, six percent in the forest floor, one percent 
in the understory, and only 33 percent in living trees.”). 
61. MAC Recommendations, supra note 34, at 61–62.
62. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at 19.  This standard is the same as the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative standard for GHG emissions. 
63. See Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 2 (“Adherence to the Reserve’s high
standards ensures that emissions reductions associated with projects are real, 
permanent and additional, thereby instilling confidence in the environmental 
benefit, credibility and efficiency of the U.S. carbon market.”);  see also ETAAC Report, 
supra note 5, at 7.   
64. See Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 2.
65. To view previous versions of the Forest Protocol, see Forest Project Protocol
Development, CLIMATE ACTION RESERVE, http://www.climateactionreserve.org/how/ 
protocols/adopted/forest/development/ (last visited April 23, 2011). 
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permanent, additional, verifiable, and enforceable.”66  
The Forest Protocol divides forest-based offset projects into three 
categories: reforestation, project management, and avoided conversion.67  A 
reforestation project “restor[es] tree cover on land that is not at optimal 
stocking levels and has minimal short-term (30-years) commercial 
opportunities.”68  A management project requires a change in “management 
activities [to] maintain or increase carbon stocks on forested land relative to 
baseline levels of carbon stocks.”69  Last, an avoided conversion project prevents 
the “conversion of forestland to a non-forest land use by dedicating the land to 
continuous forest cover through a conservation easement or transfer to public 
ownership.”70   
The Forest Protocol has specific requirements for both the additional and 
permanence elements of a forest-based offset.  The baseline from which to 
measure additionality includes “all laws, regulations, and legally-binding 
commitments applicable to the Project Area at the time of the project’s 
initiation that could affect standing live carbon stocks.”71  Legal constraints also 
include government regulations that may influence zoning, restrictions, and 
stocking standards, as well as forest practice rules, and other legally binding 
requirements (including covenants, easements, and conservation plans).72 
 The Forest Protocol’s permanence requirement specifies that the 
sequestered carbon must be stored for “at least 100 years.”73  This includes 
monitoring, reporting, and verification throughout the 100 years, execution of a 
Project Implementation Agreement obligating the forest owner to “retire CRTs 
[carbon offset credits] to compensate for GHG reductions and removals,” and 
the maintenance of a “Buffer Pool to provide insurance against reversals of GHG 
reductions and removals due to unavoidable causes.”74  The Buffer Pool system 
will be discussed further in a Part IV.B. 
E. Western Climate Initiative Standards
 Forest-based offsets that satisfy California’s standards will be 
incorporated into a regional cap-and-trade market through the Western Climate 
66. See Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 3.
67. Id. at 4–5.
68. Id. at 4.
69. Id. at 5.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 53.
72. Id. at 54. In California, the baseline must also include silvicultural
treatments or any requirements in the California Forest Practice Rules.  Id. at 53–54. 
73. Id. at 7.
74. Id. at 62.
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Initiative (“WCI”).75  The WCI is a coalition of four Canadian provinces and 
California, whose purpose is to create a regional cap-and-trade market for 
voluntary and mandatory emission reductions.76  California’s participation in the 
WCI market is in lieu of creating its own exclusive cap-and-trade market.77  
Accordingly, California must comply with the WCI’s standards in order to 
participate in the regional market.   
The WCI created an Offsets Committee (“Committee”) for the express 
purpose of developing standardized guidelines for the regional market.78  The 
WCI defined offsets as tradable “compliance instruments.”79  The broad 
definition was purposeful,80 in order encompass each member’s unique offset 
standards.  The Committee rejected specific measures for determining 
permanence and decided to leave regulatory details up to each jurisdiction.81 
The Committee does; however, requires the project owner provide a 
“contingency plan which addresses how, in the event of a reversal that is the 
result of proponent intention or negligence, any affected offset certificates will 
be replaced.”82  This contingency plan must be enforceable regardless of the 
proponent’s solvency or ownership interest in the project.83  The WCI’s 
contingency requirement will be satisfied through the Forest Protocol’s Buffer 
Pool, discussed further in Part IV.B.   
The Committee additionally requires that the offset project owner legally 
own the GHG reduction resulting from the project.84  The Committee specifically 
contemplated that carbon offsets may include a property right, and in the 
absence of such property right, requires the jurisdiction to provide an 
explanation of the applicable legal framework.85  The Committee will consider 
differing legal frameworks when finalizing the program’s regulations.86 
75. See Resolution 11-32, supra note 3.
76. History, WESTERN CLIMATE INITIATIVE, http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/
history (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
77. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at ES-8, 30.
78. Offset Committee Task Group 3, Offset Protocol Review, WESTERN CLIMATE 
INITIATIVE 1 (April, 2010) [hereinafter WCI Review], available at http://www. 
westernclimateinitiative.org/component/remository/Offsets-Committee-Documents/ 
WCI-Review-of-Existing-Offset-Protocols/. 
79. Offset System Essential Elements Final Recommendations Paper,  WESTERN CLIMATE 
INITIATIVE 2 (July, 2010) [hereinafter WCI Recommendations], available at 
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/archived_comments/Offsets%20Essential%20
Elements%20Final%20Recommendations.277.pdf.  
80. WCI Review, supra note 78, at 11.
81. Id. at 16.
82. WCI Recommendations, supra note 78, at 6.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Id. at 12.
86. Id.
 West  Northwest, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 2012 
304 
F. Other GHG Reduction Frameworks
There are many other GHG reduction frameworks, including the Kyoto 
Protocol, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), and the Midwest 
Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord (“Accord”).  California is not a member of 
any of these reduction systems, and they are not directly relevant to the creation 
of a Californian carbon-sequestration right.  The United States has chosen not 
to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and California cannot do so unilaterally.87  In 
addition, the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism project only 
incorporates forest-based offsets in developing countries, whereas California 
has no such restriction.88  The RGGI is a mandatory system with a GHG 
reduction goal that applies only to power plants, whereas AB 32 requires GHG 
reductions from many more firms.89  Last, the Accord plans to be compatible 
with the WCI, of which California is already member.90   
III. Challenges Facing Current Forest-Based Offset Projects
Forest-based offsets face a unique mix of challenges, but some stand
above the rest.  Primary environmental challenges include ensuring permanence 
and avoiding leakage; regulatory challenges include verification and 
enforcement; and legal challenges revolve around the inadequacy of 
conservation easements and timber rights.  These challenges are so intertwined 
that, without a sufficient legal framework to support forest-based offset projects, 
they may become too much to overcome.   
A. Environmental Challenges
The unharnessed power of nature affects forests on a daily basis, 
subjecting forest-based offset projects to uncertainties that may be beyond 
human control.  This creates a challenge to ensuring permanence and avoiding 
leakage.  A carbon sequestration right may not be able to affect the elements 
but will give offset project owners the ability to cope with and potentially avoid 
reversibility and leakage.  
Permanent storage of carbon is essential for the success of an offset 
project; however, it is difficult achieve because sequestration is subject to 
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Midwestern Greenhouse Gas Reduction Accord, CORE: CARBON OFFSET RESEARCH &
EDUCATION, http://www.co2offsetresearch.org/policy/MGGRA.html (last visited April 
23, 2011). 
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reversibility.91  Reversibility is the concept that carbon may not stay permanently 
stored for the time necessary to achieve an emission reduction.92  Natural 
reversals may occur due to natural disasters such as forest fires or severe insect 
infestations.  Reversals can also occur due to events such as logging or human-
caused fires.  Right now, there is no way to guarantee that presently safe forest-
offset projects will not be harmed in the future.93   
Avoiding leakage is an additional challenge to the success of an offset 
project.  Avoiding leakage means that an offset project does not “simply 
displace emissions from within the project area to areas outside the project 
boundaries, thereby destroying the environmental integrity of the effort.”94  The 
Forest Protocol specifically identifies timber harvesting as an area of concern 
and recognizes the likelihood that a forest-based offset project may merely shift 
harvesting from the project area to other forestlands.95  If an offset project 
displaces rather than removes or reduces emissions, it does not actually offset 
any emissions.  
B. Regulatory Challenges
In order for a forest-based offset to be marketable within a cap-and-trade 
market, it must satisfy applicable regulations.96  The Forest Protocol requires 
that offset projects be both verifiable and enforceable.97  Verification and 
enforcement are difficult to achieve due to intertwined legal interests between 
the forest owner and the offset project owner.  A carbon sequestration right will 
be able to clarify ownership interests and thus alleviate regulatory headaches 
due to uncertain ownership interests.   
Verification is necessary to determine the baseline from which to measure 
sequestration.98  After the offset project begins, carbon sequestration must be 
verified every six years, and if a project is not verified, it is considered 
91. Rômulo Silveira da Rocha Sampaio, Seeing the Forest for the Treaties: The
Evolving Debates on Forest and Forestry Activities Under the Clean Development Mechanism Ten 
Years After Kyoto, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 634, 672 (2008). 
92. See Cullet, supra note 42, at 117 (“Sustainability cannot accommodate
measures with reversible effects because the mitigation of climate change is a long-
term objective that should not, and cannot, stop after ten, twenty or even ninety-nine 
years simply because this represents the end of a project.”). 
93. William Boyd, Ways of Seeing in Environmental Law: How Deforestation Became an
Object of Climate Governance, 37 ECOLOGY L.Q. 843, 870-71 (2010).  
94. Id. at 871.
95. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 21.
96. Applicable regulations include standards set by the Western Climate
Initiative, which incorporate the Forest Protocol, as well as any additional 
requirements set forth by AB 32.  
97. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 3.
98. Id. at 73.
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terminated.99  A main obstacle to verification is the scope of the offset project. 
For example, if a project owner only has a right to the trees, none of the 
sequestration occurring in the vegetation and shrubs would count toward the 
offset.  Initial and subsequent verifications are also subject to question if the 
project owner does not even have a right to the sequestered carbon in the first 
place.  
Enforcement of offset projects is challenging for regulators as well as 
project owners.  Regulators need to have the ability to protect stored carbon 
from actions (or omissions) by the project owner that may diminish the 
emission reduction.  Regulators and project owners need to have the ability to 
do the same against third parties.  The project owner should have a right to the 
sequestered carbon in order to have standing to enjoin actions that harm the 
sequestration process or the stored carbon.  Unfortunately, it is presently 
unclear whether a right to sequestered carbon even exists within all-inclusive 
fee ownership.100  If such a right does exist, problems may arise regarding which 
party holds it, because within the offset context, fee ownership is often split 
through the transfer of timber rights and use of conservation easements.101 
C. Legal Challenges
Proper legal tools are necessary to harness the natural uncertainty 
involved in forest-based offset projects and manage regulatory problems.  The 
two most prominent legal tools currently supporting offset projects are 
conservation easements and timber rights.  Neither of these provides sufficient 
rights to ensure that project owners can cope with reversibility or leakage.  They 
also do nothing to assist verification of sequestered carbon, and give neither 
project owners nor government agencies the tools to enforce sequestration. 
Their shortfalls have the potential to hinder the development and use of forest-
based offsets.   
1. Conservation Easements
Conservation easements are the preferred real property method for 
securing forest-based offset projects; however, they do not appropriately protect 
offset projects.102  California’s conservation easement law defines a conservation 
easement as a limitation binding upon successive owners with the purpose of 
99. Id. at 11.
100. See supra note 15.
101. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 5.
102. The Forest Protocol requires that a conservation easement support the
offset project.  It is unclear from the Forest Protocol what the requirement that the 
conservation easement “support the project” means.  It is possible that it means an 
express reference to the offset project in the conservation easement is required. 
Alternatively, it may mean that, while the conservation easement need not expressly 
permit the carbon offset project, neither may it prohibit the project.  Id. at 16. 
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retaining land in its natural state.103  It is “an interest in real property voluntarily 
created and freely transferable in whole or in part” and is “perpetual in 
duration.”104   
First, conservation easements do not address carbon sequestration. 
Through a conservation easement, land is transferred to a land trust (or 
government agency) for the purpose of conserving the land.105  The land trusts 
holds the easement for the benefit of the public,106 not for the benefit of the firm 
using the offset to reduce its emissions.  Currently, conservation easements 
support forest-based offset projects merely through a “latent” right because 
such easements do not include language protecting carbon sequestration.107 
Second, courts are likely to scrutinize conservation easements due to 
common law hostility toward permanent land restrictions.108  None of 
California’s eighteen statutory easements mentions or even alludes to carbon 
sequestration.109  The closest easement language includes the “right of taking 
water, wood, minerals, and other things” or the right of “receiving air, light, or 
heat from or over, or discharging the same upon or over land . . .”110  Fitting a 
carbon sequestration right into either of those definitions is problematic.  Thus, 
a carbon sequestration right must explicitly provide for a right in stored carbon 
to ensure that, even under close scrutiny, courts will respect the quasi-
permanent land restriction necessary to satisfy offset requirements. 
Although the conservation easement statute states that the characteristics 
of a conservation easement are those specified in the instrument creating the 
easement,111 it is notable that it does not specify that the right transferred is that 
specified in the easement.  Further, all interest not explicitly transferred remain 
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.1 (West 2011).  “For the purposes of this chapter,
“conservation easement” means any limitation in a deed, will, or other instrument in 
the form of an easement, restriction, covenant, or condition, which is or has been 
executed by or on behalf of the owner of the land subject to such easement and is 
binding upon successive owners of such land, and the purpose of which is to retain 
land predominantly in its natural, scenic, historical, agricultural, forested, or open-
space condition.” 
104. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.2 (West 2011).
105. James L. Olmstead, Capturing the Value of Appreciated Development Rights on
Conservation Easement Termination, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 39, 50 (2006) 
[hereinafter Olmstead Capturing].   
106. Id.
107. Olmstead Carbon Dieting, supra note 43, at 135.
108. Kenison, supra note 55, at 67.  One commenter has suggested that it is
intended as the sole means by which such easements can now be created.  See 
Comment, Open Space Procurement Under Colorado’s Scenic Easement Law, 60 U. Colo. L. 
Rev. 383 (1989). 
109. CAL. CIV. CODE 801 (West 2011).
110. CAL. CIV. CODE § 801(5), (8) (West 2011).
111. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.2(d) (West 2011).
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with the owner of the land.112  Even if liberally construed,113 interpreting the 
statute to create and protect a carbon sequestration right would be a stretch.   
Third, conservation easements do not sufficiently protect a forest-based 
offset as a financial service.114  California’s conservation easement statute begins 
with a statement of public purpose in support of the preservation and 
conservation of important environmental assets.115  This makes it clear that in 
California, conservation easements protect conservation values, not the 
economic service provided through a forest-based offset.116  Carbon 
sequestration is a service and is paid for and traded in markets as an 
economically valuable entity.  The price paid is for sequestration, rather than 
conservation.117  Thus, under a conservation easement, if there were a situation 
pitting carbon sequestration against a traditional conservation value, 
conservation would prevail to the detriment of the offset project. 118   
The continued use of conservation easements to support forest-based 
offset projects may make determining who owns certain rights difficult.  A clearly 
delineated carbon sequestration right can protect a forest-based offset project 
even if another form of conservation or financial project is on the same land.  
2. Timber Rights
In addition to conservation easements, timber rights have been used to 
support forest-based offsets.  Timber rights are a common form of transferring 
ownership of one of the most prominent elements of a forest, the trees.  Under 
California law, timber rights are included in fee ownership,119 thus the fee owner 
112. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815.4 (West 2011).
113. CAL. CIV. CODE  § 816 (West 2011).
114. See generally Laurie Ristino, Conservation Easements in an Ecosystem Services Age,
24 Nat. Resources & Env’t 56 (Winter 2010). 
115. CAL. CIV. CODE § 815 (West 2011).  “The Legislature finds and declares that
the preservation of land in its natural, scenic, agricultural, historical, forested, or 
open-space condition is among the most important environmental assets of 
California. The Legislature further finds and declares it to be the public policy and in 
the public interest of this state to encourage the voluntary conveyance of 
conservation easements to qualified nonprofit organizations.”  
116. See Ristino, supra note 114, at 57 (discussing the shortfalls of conservation
easements). 
117. Id.
118. Providing special protection for carbon sequestration may have
unintended consequences and harm other ecosystem services, animals, or 
conservation goals.    
119. In California, property includes “all mines, minerals, and quarries in the
land, all standing timber whether or not belonging to the owner of the land, and all 
rights and privileges appertaining thereto.” CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 104(b) (West 
2011).  
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may transfer that right to a third party (for example, an offset project owner).120  
California timber rights include “standing timber,” and do not purport to 
include carbon sequestration or soil, grass, and shrubs.121  If only timber rights 
secure an offset project, then carbon sequestration is not actually secured.122  If 
an offset project does not include the right to the item it purports to sell, then it 
cannot sell it.   
Even if timber rights include carbon sequestration, trees are responsible 
for less than half of a forest’s carbon sequestration.123  Equating carbon 
sequestration with timber rights is thus highly problematic.  An explicit carbon 
sequestration right would eliminate the murky problems that occur when 
carbon sequestration is secured merely by timber rights. 
IV. The Case For a Carbon Sequestration Right
A carbon sequestration right would avoid the environmental, regulatory,
and legal challenges facing offset projects before they affect the cap-and-trade 
market.  The most effective form for this right is a real property easement.  A 
carbon sequestration easement would help ensure permanence, clarify 
ownership of stored carbon, and assist enforcement efforts.  It would also 
promote market security and provide a model for other jurisdictions.   
A. Basic Characteristics of a Carbon Sequestration Right
A carbon sequestration right encompassing both the sequestration and 
storage of carbon would support the marketability of forest-based offsets.124  
There are two main options for this type of right: personal property or real 
property. 
A personal property right would arise from a right in the initial emission 
allowance.  For example, in Australia, under the Carbon Pollution Reduction 
Scheme, permits are considered a personal property right.125  For this to occur in 
California’s scheme, the carbon offset credits that the Reserve issues to each 
project would need to constitute a personal property right.  However, unlike 
Australia, neither AB 32 nor the Scoping Plan provide for a right in carbon offset 
120. A non-fee owner can transfer and hold title to standing timber. See, e.g.,
Sears v. Ackerman, 138 Cal. 583 (1903). 
121. Id.
122. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 17, at 3–4.
123. See supra note 7.
124. Michelle Passero, The Nature of the Right of Interest Created by a Market for Forest
Carbon, 3 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 248 (2008). 
125. Id. at 57.  (“[T]he CPRS goes a step further in the regulatory treatment of
emission rights in that it explicitly refers to the allowance holder’s right to 
compensation in the event of expropriation of its emission rights by the 
Government.”).   
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credits or emission allowances.126  California affirmatively made this decision to 
avoid potential takings issues if the state altered a firm’s emission allowance.127  
Accordingly, a personal property right would be an inappropriate form for a 
carbon sequestration right. 
A real property right is desirable because the carbon sequestration 
process is included in forest management, and forest management is an interest 
in real property.128  In addition, a real property right would provide stronger 
enforcement mechanisms than contracts129 and may help standardize 
enforcement proceedings brought to protect offset projects.130   
As an easement, a carbon sequestration right would support 
sequestration as a conservation right founded as an interest in real property.131  
It must encompass carbon stored not just in trees but also in vegetation, 
shrubs, grass, and soil.132  The right must also include an entitlement to 
currently stored carbon as well carbon stored in the future133 and last for at least 
100 years.134  The easement should provide both the project owner and the state 
secure standing and preserve the carbon sequestration and additionally give the 
project owner a right to access the property to foster sequestration and 
storage.135   
B. Permanence
One of the most prominent benefits of a carbon sequestration easement 
would be the support of the permanence element of an offset project.136  Under 
the Forest Protocol, an offset project must exist for roughly five generations.137  
In the absence of a property right, contracts are commonly used as the legal 
framework to support an offset.  Unfortunately, contracts are poor tools to 
support offset projects because they unlikely to last for 100 years and have 
126. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at 110.
127. Passero, supra note 124, at 253.
128. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 17, at 3.
129. See Passero, supra note 124, at 250–52 (comparing contract law with real
property law).   
130. See Roundtable Discussion, supra note 17, at 4–5 (discussing the benefits
of a carbon sequestration right). 
131. E-mail from Michelle Passero, Senior Climate Policy Advisor, The Nature
Conservancy to Carbon Rights Discussion Group (April 11, 2011) (on file with 
author).  
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 17, at 3.
137. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 7.
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limited remedies.138  Real property instruments are more likely than contracts to 
last for 100 years because they have the ability to run in perpetuity until 
termination and thus bind present and future landowners and activities.139 
In addition, an offset project owner should not be able to efficiently 
breach a contract and abandon the project.  With a contract, parties can modify 
remedies.140  Contracts are also susceptible to vague terms, and intentional or 
negligent drafting.141  Property right remedies, however, are more secure than 
contractual remedies.  Easements have strong and clear remedies because 
history has required heightened levels of security in order to facilitate market 
transfers.142  Weak remedies create uncertainty that in turn would increase risk 
and thus increase price, making the property less desirable.143  A carbon 
sequestration easement would also specifying forms of remedies in order to 
ensure the project is permanent. 
C. Ownership and Enforceability
Clear recognition of a carbon sequestration easement will help secure the 
“title to carbon” through verification of reductions, execution of contracts, and 
enforcement of the offset.144  Specifically, it would clarify who owns the 
sequestered carbon, versus the trees or the underlying land.145  Under the Forest 
Protocol, a forest-based offset is not approved unless the project owner also 
owns the right to sequester the carbon.146   
Often times, multiple parties have property interests within the same 
forest.  Even a fee owner may be restricted by covenants and easements that 
give an interest in the property to a third party.147  Currently, the Reserve decides 
who holds the required rights if the fee interest is fractured.148  In “some cases, 
the Reserve may determine that an entity or individual that is not the owner in 
fee nonetheless does have a complete and perpetual interest in the trees on the 
property.”149   
138. E-mail from Michelle Passero, supra note 131.
139. Roundtable Discussion, supra note 17, at 3–4.
140. Tamar Frankel, Essay: The Legal Infrastructure of Markets: The Role of Contract
and Property Law, 73 B.U.L. REV. 389, 400 (1993). 
141. Id.
142. Id. at 401.
143. Id.
144. Passero, supra note 124, at 252.
145. Id.
146. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 5–10. The Forest Owner must sign an
“Attestation of Title” upon each project verification. 
147. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 5.
148. Id.
149. Id. at at 5–7.
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This essentially means that the Reserve is equating a right to control the 
trees with the right to sequester carbon, perhaps to reflect California’s timber 
rights.  Reliance on timber rights, as previously discussed, is inherently 
problematic.150  In addition to the shortcomings of timber rights, it is troubling 
that the Reserve is subjectively determining ownership interests in carbon.  
Ownership should be recognized through law; its existence should not depend 
upon the discretion of a governmental agency.  The use of a carbon 
sequestration easement would provide chain of title that would combat these 
problems and assist enforcement.  
D. Market Security
Without clear ownership rights and a solid legal framework, offset projects 
are insecure, and firms are therefore hesitant to them as a tool to reduce GHG 
emissions.  In effect, the lack of a secure offset framework has the ability create a 
market barrier to the successful implementation of AB 32.151  
The Chicago Climate Exchange (“CCX”) provides a direct example of how a 
lack of market security can harm a cap-and-trade market.  The CCX was North 
America’s “largest and longest running greenhouse gas emission reduction 
program.”152  Within the CCX, over 300 members volunteered to reduce GHG 
emissions through 2010.153  Members commonly traded forest-based offsets as 
standardized communities within the market.154   
Some of the problems that prevented members from renewing their 
commitment to voluntary reductions past 2010 arose from CCX’s “relaxed” land 
restriction requirements for forest-based offset projects.155  Within CCX, only 
restrictive covenants supported forest-based offsets because they were easier to 
alter than conservations easement.156  It took “a large leap of faith” for CCX’s 
members to believe that the restrictive covenants and relaxed regulations would 
actually result in a permanent carbon sequestration.157  In fact, now that CCX is 
closed, there is no enforcement mechanism to ensure that the previously traded 
150. See supra Part III.C.
151. See ETAAC Report, supra note 5, at 4.
152. See Overview, CHICAGO CLIMATE EXCHANGE, http://www.chicago 
climatex.com/content.jsf?id=23 (last visited on April 23, 2011) [hereinafter CCX 
Overview].  
153. Kenison, supra note 55, at 64.  See also CCX Overview, supra note 147 (“From
2003 through 2010 CCX operated as a comprehensive cap and trade program . . . [i]n 
2011 CCX launched the Chicago Climate Exchange Offsets Registry Program.” 
154. Kenison, supra note 55, at 63.
155. Id. at 66.
156. Id. at 66–67.
157. Id.
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offset projects continue to sequester carbon.158  
The CCX’s requirements were seriously flawed when it came to actually 
reducing GHG emissions.  It is imperative that California does not merely 
purport to reduce emissions but actually does.  A carbon sequestration 
easement would ensure that offset projects are legally enforceable over long 
periods as well as clarify ownership and in turn enhance the transferability of 
forest-based offsets.  CCX’s problems highlight the difference between voluntary 
and mandatory markets.  The mandatory nature of AB 32 makes the difference, 
and in order for it to be successful, firms must have faith in the market.  
E. Model for Future Legislation
In addition to the practical benefits of a carbon sequestration easement, 
such a right would provide a model for other jurisdictions to copy when 
considering their own GHG emission reduction plans.  The passage of AB 32 
was a historic step, which “helped put climate change on the national agenda, 
and [spurred] action by many other states.”159  In addition, as a member of the 
WCI, California is in a unique position to affect state, federal, and even 
Canadian legislation concerning carbon rights within the offset framework.   
Especially within a multi-jurisdiction context (whether it be national, 
regional, or international), it would clearly be beneficial to have a singular 
framework supporting all forest-based offsets, regardless of where the land is 
situated.  Different standards within the same market create market insecurity.  
For example, in the European Union, each country enacted its own regulations 
under their cooperative ETS Directive, resulting in multiple legal frameworks.160  
This left the private sector in fear of the resulting E.U. market.161 If other states, 
the federal government, or even international governments enact a similar 
carbon sequestration, the consistent legal framework would hopefully avoid the 
fear plaguing the E.U. market.   
V. The Scope of a Carbon Sequestration Right
A carbon sequestration right would only apply to offset projects within
California’s jurisdiction.  It would not apply to offset projects located in other 
WCI member’s territories, other states, and other countries.  Even within 
California’s boundaries, offset projects on federal or tribal land would not 
benefit from a carbon sequestration right.   
The most efficient way to expand the scope of a carbon sequestration right 
158. Id. at 65.  See also CCX Exchange Offsets and Exchange Early Action Credits, CCX 
CONFIDENTIAL, at § 9.8.4.1, app.  9.2Aiii (2004), available at http://www.scscertified.com/ 
docs/CCX_Rulebook_ Chapter09_OffsetsAndEarlyActionCredits.pdf. 
159. Scoping Plan, supra note 4, at ES-1.
160. Wemaere, supra note 10, at 49–50.
161. Id.
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would be for other states, the federal government, and other countries to enact 
their own carbon sequestration right legislation.  Until other states and 
countries enact similar legislation, an insurance system can bridge the gap in 
between offset projects in different jurisdictions.  Under an insurance system, an 
offset project not supported by a form of carbon sequestration right would be 
required to have more insurance than an otherwise supported offset project.   
A. Offset Projects in Other States and Countries
California does not have an interest in or jurisdiction to affect title to real 
property outside its borders.162  California’s courts have recognized that 
“jurisdiction to affect the title to real estate by a judgment in rem, or directly 
against the thing itself, exists only in the courts of the state wherein the land is 
situated.”163  A carbon sequestration right would be an interest in land; 
therefore, a California statute affecting property rights would not apply in other 
states or countries.   
B. Federal Land within California
The United States owns roughly 45 percent of the land in California.164  
These holdings are normally referred to as “enclaves.”165  Case law developed 
over the last century clearly recognizes federal jurisdiction over these 
enclaves.166  Once federal jurisdiction vests, it cannot be rescinded without 
congressional action,167 because “[s]tates do not have authority to legislate for 
areas under the exclusive legislative jurisdiction of the United States.”168 
 In 1954, the Department of Justice recognized that federal-state 
jurisdictional relations were in “a confused and chaotic state” and 
commissioned an interdepartmental committee to thoroughly study federal 
162. 33 CAL. JUR  3d. Family Law § 758 (West 2011).
163. Taylor v. Taylor, 192 Cal. 71, 76 (1923).
164. See Printable Maps: Federal Lands and Indian Reservations, NATIONAL ATLAS (Feb.
3, 2011), http://www.nationalatlas.gov/printable/fedlands.html.  For California, see 
California: Federal Lands and Indian Reservations, NATIONAL ATLAS (2003), http:// 
www.nationalatlas.gov/printable/images/pdf/fedlands/CA.pdf. 
165. 91 C.J.S. Continued Operation of State Laws § 15 (2011).
166. Lowell H. Becraft, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction, CONST. SOC’Y, http://www.
constitution.org/juris/fedjur1.htm (last visited April 23, 2011). 
167. Id.
168. INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL
AREAS WITHIN THE STATES, JURISDICTION OVER FEDERAL AREAS WITHIN THE STATES 5–6 (1957) 
[hereinafter Committee Report], available at http://www.cspoa.org/library/ 
convention_packet_2012/EISENHOW/Jurisdiction%20Over%20Federal%20Areas%20W
ithin%20The%20States.pdf.    
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legislative jurisdiction.169  The committee concluded that, even though federal 
land is within state boundaries, it “does not take from Congress the power to . . . 
prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them, even 
though this may involve the exercise of . . . police power.”170  The Constitution 
granted power to the federal government over its land, thus permitting it to 
prevent interference by the states.171 
The basis for this jurisdiction is in Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the 
Constitution.172  Out of this clause grew the notion that the federal government 
holds property for the benefit of all states and thus should not be subject to the 
jurisdiction and laws of any particular state.173  Although this clause was not 
originally interpreted in a uniform fashion174 many states enacted statutes 
allowing the federal government to acquire state land, the effect of which was 
“implementing clause [seventeen] and thereby vesting in the United States 
exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all lands acquired by it in the States.”175  
Under these statutes, states relinquished control over federal enclaves.176 
Over time, the federal government relinquished some jurisdictional 
control, allowed states to tax on federal lands, and exercise some forms of civil 
and criminal regulation.177  However, the federal government has never allowed 
a state to control federal property rights, states are not even allowed to regulate 
wildlife on federal lands, let alone the land itself.178  A California carbon 
sequestration right would therefore not apply on federal enclaves within the 
state. 
C. Tribal Land
Similar to the federal government, Indian tribes are not subordinate to 
169. Id. at iv.  (“On my recommendation, and with your approval, there was
organized on December 15, 1954, an interdepartmental committee to study problems 
of jurisdiction related to federally owned property within the States.”). 
170. Id. at 255.
171. Id. at 260.
172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17; see also Committee Report, supra note 168, at
132–136 (the California Constitution reserves state jurisdiction from the federal 
government in situations regarding water on lands subsequently acquired by the 
federal government).  
173. Committee Report Part I, supra note 168, at 7.
174. Id. at 9.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 10.  (“[T]he transfer to the United States of exclusive legislative
jurisdiction over an area has the effect, speaking generally, of divesting the State and 
any governmental entities operating under its authority of any right to tax or control 
private persons or property upon the area.”). 
177. Id.
178. National Audubon Society v. Davis, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (N.D. Cal. 2000),
rev’d in part on other grounds, 307 F.3d 835 (9th Cir. 2002). 
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state governments.179  However, tribes often do not hold title to their own land; 
the United States holds the majority of tribal land in trust for the benefit of the 
tribe.180  A statutory definition of tribal land includes “any tract, or interest 
therein, that the United States holds in trust status for the benefit of a tribe or 
individual Indian” and “land the title to which is held by an individual Indian or 
a tribe and which can only be alienated or encumbered by the owner with the 
approval of the Secretary because of limitations contained in the conveyance 
instrument pursuant to federal law.”181 
Accordingly, both federal and tribal laws govern easements on tribal 
land.182  Under federal law, leases on tribal land are limited to twenty-five years, 
with an option to extend for an additional twenty-five years, subject to approval 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”).183  The BIA must also approve easements 
lasting longer than seven years.184  These restrictions are extra obstacles an 
offset project owner must satisfy in order to ensure a project on tribal land is 
permanent.   
State interest in governing tribal land is normally too minimal to compete 
with otherwise applicable federal law.185  However, if there is a strong enough 
interest, a state may regulate tribal land.186  Conservation of state resources has 
previously been held to be an interest strong enough to interfere with tribal 
rights.187  Carbon sequestration easements are meant to support the 
marketability of forest-based offset projects; conservation is at best a secondary 
goal.  As such, it seems unlikely that a court would consider a carbon 
179. See e.g. Legislator’s Handbook, 2011, MONTANA LEGISLATURE 5 (Dec. 12, 2010),
http://leg.mt.gov/css/For-Legislators/Publications/legislator%20handbook.asp 
(“Indian tribes have the right to develop their own form of government and to 
establish their own civil and criminal laws.”).   
180. National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3120
(West 2011) (“Nothing in this title shall be construed to diminish or expand the trust 
responsibility of the United States toward Indian forest lands, or any legal obligation 
or remedy resulting therefrom.”).  There is also restricted fee land, where the tribe 
holds title but the land cannot be alienated, and fee land purchased by tribes, where 
the tribe acquires the land under statutory authority.  Tribal and Indian Land, TRIBAL
ENERGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL INFORMATION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://teeic.anl.gov/triballand/ 
index.cfm (last visited April 23, 2011).   
181. 25 C.F.R. 162.101 (West 2012).
182. Stephen P. Kelly et al., Lex Helius: The Law of Solar Energy: Tribal Laws and
Land Issues, AGRICULTURAL MARKETING RESOURCE CENTER 2, http://www.agmrc.org/ 
media/cms/Tribal_Laws_and_Land_Issues_F3057C0C07496.pdf (last visited April 23, 
2011).   
183. 25 U.S.C. § 415 (West 2011).
184. 25 U.S.C. § 81 (West 2011).
185. Jane Marx et al., Tribal Jurisdiction Over Reservation Water Quality and Quantity,
43 S.D. L. REV. 315, 340–41 (1998).   
186. See generally 41 AM. JUR. 2d. Indians; Native Americans § 46 (2011).
187. Id.
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sequestration easement paramount to federal law, especially because a 
preemption analysis must be determined with the goal of tribal self-governance 
in mind.188   
Even if a carbon sequestration easement could be considered for the 
primary benefit of conservation, environmental regulation on tribal land has 
generally not been left up to states.  In Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA,189 
the court affirmed the EPA’s rejection of Washington Department of Ecology’s 
request to regulate activities on tribal lands under the Resource Conservation 
and Recovery Act.190  The court determined that states could not exercise 
jurisdiction over tribal land in the absence of express Congressional intent.191  
This decision laid the framework “for a conclusive determination that states are 
pre-empted even from environmental regulation of non-Indians within Indian 
country.”192  Therefore, regardless of the primary purpose of a carbon 
sequestration easement, it is practically impossible to apply a California 
statutory right on tribal land. 
D. Expanding the Scope
Although a carbon sequestration right is limited in scope, a cap-and-trade 
market system can still incorporate offset projects in every jurisdiction.  The 
most direct way to expand the scope is to encourage other jurisdictions to 
adopt a similar carbon sequestration right.  The more practical way to 
incorporate multi-jurisdiction offset projects would be through an insurance 
program that rates risk based on the nature of the legal framework supporting 
the offset project.  
1. Codifying a Federal or Tribal Statute
The most direct way for a carbon sequestration right to apply on federal 
land would be pursuant to a federal statute.  A federal statute would also apply 
to the land the federal government holds in trust for the benefit of tribes.193  A 
federal carbon sequestration right would likely be codified around the current 
conservation easement statute, in Chapter 7, Section 1997 of the United States 
Code.194  In the alternative to a federal right, tribes are sovereign and could 
188. Marx, supra note 185, at 316.
189. 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1469-70.
192. Marx, supra note 185, at 342.
193. National Indian Forest Resources Management Act, 25 U.S.C. § 3104
(West 2011). 
194. 7 U.S.C. § 1997 (West 2011).
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adopt a carbon sequestration right within tribal law.195  Tribal enactment would 
also cover land not held by the federal government. 
2. Insurance Contributions Determined by Legal Support
Regardless of the use of a carbon sequestration right, there is an ever-
present risk of loss inherent in an offset project.196  Insurance is therefore 
necessary to protect the project’s promised emission reduction from human or 
natural destruction that may hinder the carbon sequestration and storage.197  
Basing insurance contributions on an offset project’s risk would help integrate 
multi-jurisdiction projects into a singular market.   
Unfortunately, insurance companies do not yet provide standard policies 
for offset projects.198  An alternative form of insurance is a “back-up forest.”199  
Under this form of insurance, the project owner splits the forest into two 
unequal parts.  The larger becomes the actual offset project, and the smaller 
becomes the back-up forest.  Like the offset project, the back-up forest is 
managed to sequester and store carbon to reduce and remove emissions.200  If 
the offset project is harmed, the back-up forest’s emission reductions are 
credited to the offset project.201  For example, under the CCX rules, the back-up 
forest was equal to 20 percent the entire forest, and its emission reductions 
were credited to the offset project if it failed to meet its reduction goal.202  
In California, the Forest Protocol requires project owners to contribute a 
portion of the offset project’s carbon-offset credits to a Buffer Pool.203  If an 
unavoidable reversal of carbon sequestration or storage occurs, the Reserve 
removes the equivalent amount of carbon-offset credits from the Buffer Pool 
and credits them to the offset project.204  The Buffer Pool holds carbon offset 
credits in what is essentially an insurance account for all offset projects.205   
195. Tribes even have authority to regulate non-Indian owners on their land.
In Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981), the Court held that “Indian tribes 
retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-
Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands.” 
196. Olmstead Carbon Dieting, supra note 43, at 133–34.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 134.
199. A completely separate forest can include a portion of the forest that the
actual offset project is on.  For example, 90 percent of the forest may be used for the 
offset project, while 10 percent is the back-up forest. 
200. Olmstead Carbon Dieting, supra note 43, at 133–34.
201. Id.
202. Kenison, supra note 55, at 65.
203. Forest Protocol, supra note 6, at 61.
204. Id. at 45–56.  If the reversal was avoidable, then the owner must
compensate by removing CRTs from its own Reserve account. 
205. Id. at 67.
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The Reserve calculates a project’s Buffer Pool contribution by multiplying 
the total reduction goal by the risk level.206  The risk assessment is unique to 
each project.207  The Forest Protocol provides an example of a risk evaluation: If 
the Reserve issues an offset project ten carbon offset credits, and the project’s 
risk rating is 10 percent, then nine carbon offset credits go to the owner’s reserve 
account, and one credit goes to the Buffer Pool.208  The risk assessment is 
reviewed on a yearly basis.209  If the risk declines throughout the project’s life, 
the Reserve may return carbon offset credits that were held in the Buffer Pool 
and vice versa if the risk increases.210  
 Currently, the Reserve considers an offset project’s risk level lower if the 
project owner simultaneously records a conservation easement with the offset 
project.211  The Reserve also contemplates that the use of alternate third-party 
insurance would lower the offset project’s the risk level.212   
A carbon sequestration right could lower an offset project’s risk level in a 
way similar to a conservation easement or an alternate form of third-party 
insurance.  In fact, a carbon sequestration easement would functionally provide 
more security than a conservation easement.  The use of such a right to secure 
an offset project should lower the risk level and in turn lower contributions to 
the Buffer Pool.  An equivalent offset projects not supported by a carbon 
sequestration right would thus be required to contribute more to the Buffer 
Pool.  Higher contributions may also encourage other jurisdictions to adopt a 
carbon sequestration right.  Within a cap-and-trade system, like the WCI’s 
proposed market, insurance contributions based on risk will facilitate the trade 
of offset projects located in every jurisdiction. 
VI. Conclusion
A carbon sequestration right would support the use of forest-based offsets
to facilitate the satisfaction of AB 32’s emission reduction standards.  Under AB 
32, California will enter into a cap-and-trade market with Canadian provinces 
through the WCI.  The WCI market will include only forest-based offsets that are 
verifiable, real, additional, and permanent.  Firms participating in the market 
will be more willing to purchase these offsets when they are assured that a 
secure legal tool supports the underlying carbon sequestration and storage.   
A conscientiously drafted and implemented carbon sequestration right 
will provide adequate legal support for forest-based offset projects.  The right 
206. Id. at 65.
207. Id. at 66.
208. Id. at 67.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 62.
212. Id.
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must be based in real property, explicitly apply to both carbon sequestration 
and storage, last for 100 years, and clarify who owns present and future carbon 
reserves.  A carbon sequestration easement will satisfy these requirements.  The 
scope of this right is limited to offset projects located within California’s 
jurisdiction; however, within a cap-and-trade market, an insurance system can 
help incorporate offset projects located in other jurisdictions.  Under this 
system, risk-based insurance contributions will be lower for offset projects 
supported by a carbon sequestration right when compared to an equivalent 
project not supported by such a right.  In addition to these suggestions, there is 
still much to be determined regarding the form and application of a carbon 
sequestration right; however, it is clear that such a right would be beneficial.   
